and a particular full moon and a particular eclipse, each is a particular event that comes into being after not existing and ceases to be after existing. If he knows it individually, the very change in his knowledge that they sought to avoid necessarily follows. For if he knows it before it exists, he knows it as nonexistent but yet to exist; then, when it exists, he knows it as existing. Then, when it ceases to exist, he knows it as nonexistent but having previously existed. This is precisely what they sought to escape.

If he knew particulars individually through unchanging knowledge, it would follow that infinitely many objects of understanding exist perpetually within his essence.

As for his statement:

“For example, he understands that a particular eclipse occurs when the moon—itself a particular entity—is, at such-and-such a time—itself a particular time—in opposition to such-and-such. That eclipse may then occur without the first knower being aware whether it has occurred or not, even though he understands it in the first manner. For this is another, particular perception, which arises when the perceived event occurs and ceases when it ceases. That first understanding remains constant throughout all time, even though he has knowledge of a particular.”

The response is:

Is this known eclipse a single individual eclipse, or an eclipse considered as a type? The first would be to know that the sun is eclipsed in Aries in a particular year—the year of the Flood. The second would be to understand that, in all cases, if it is in such-and-such a zodiacal sign in such-and-such a configuration, it is eclipsed.

If it is said, “It is a particular eclipse,” then, if his understanding of it is eternally constant, it must have been