has occurred now, and is prior to it, or will occur after it. Rather, it is like our understanding that a particular eclipse occurs when the moon, itself a particular entity, is in opposition to such-and-such at such-and-such a time, itself a particular time.

That eclipse may then occur without the first knower being aware whether it has occurred or not, even though he understands it in the first manner. For this is another, particular perception, which arises when the perceived event occurs and ceases when it ceases.

The first understanding, however, remains constant throughout all time, even though it is knowledge of a particular. That is, the knower understands that, between the moon’s being in one position and its being in another, a specific eclipse occurs at a time a definite interval from the first of these two states. His understanding of this remains constant before, during, and after the eclipse.”

These are his exact words.

I say:

What he has mentioned is possible only with things that, according to him, are everlasting, such as the sun, the moon, the stars, and the celestial spheres. He knows these as individual entities because they are everlasting.

As for things that arise anew, such as their movements, solar and lunar eclipses, the appearance of the new crescent and the full moon, and individual human beings and animals, it is inconceivable that he should understand these except in a universal manner—for example, by knowing that every month brings a new crescent and a full moon, and every year brings summer and winter.

As for knowledge of a particular appearance of the new crescent