This is because, if he says, “Knowledge itself is a relation,” then multiplicity and renewal within knowledge are relational.

If he says, “Rather, it is a relational attribute, and multiplicity lies in what is known, not in knowledge itself; He knows all objects of knowledge through a single knowledge,” as Ibn Kullāb, al-Ashʿarī, and those who agree with them maintain, he may be told: “Change likewise lies in what is known, not in knowledge itself, for knowledge is one and admits no multiplicity, let alone change.”

If he says, “This is false, for knowledge that something will occur is not knowledge that he said it had already occurred,” he may be told: “Likewise, knowledge of the heavens is not knowledge of the earth.”

Yet you make an even stronger claim. You say, “Knowledge is nothing other than the knower.” Indeed, you say, “Knowledge and the knower are one and the same.” Clearly, this claim is further removed from reason than the claim that knowledge of all objects of knowledge is one and the same. For the latter maintains that knowledge is neither the knower nor the object known, but an attribute of the knower.

There is no doubt that Ibn Sīnā contradicts himself on these points. Sometimes he regards knowledge as something additional to the knowing essence, while at other times he does not.

abt

[Ibn Sīnā’s discussion in al-Ishārāt and Ibn Taymiyyah’s response]

For, in refuting those who maintain that the intellect is identical with the intelligible, he said: “It thus becomes apparent