As for his words, “The essence, considered in itself”: if he means that the essence, as such, has no attributes, then such an essence does not exist, let alone possess perfection. If he means its existing reality, then, considered in that respect, it cannot but possess the attributes of perfection.

As for his words, “This is as you said concerning hearing, sight, and knowledge of particulars occurring in time, for you agreed with the other philosophers that Allah is exalted above these,” through to his statement, “There is no way out of this,” the reply is:

There is no doubt that Ibn Sīnā cannot escape this objection. For if he does not regard the absence of knowledge of particulars as a deficiency, the same applies to the absence of knowledge of universals.

If he says, “His not knowing them is a perfection,” his opponents could say, “Denying His knowledge of unchanging things is a perfection.”

If he says, “I denied this of Him because affirming it would entail change,” they may reply, “And we denied that because it would entail multiplicity.”

If he then says, “That multiplicity is not impossible,” he may be told, “Nor is this change impossible.”

For he located multiplicity in relations. If this is correct, then change may likewise be affirmed in those very relations.