If he says:

‘If motion were eternal, motion as such would not be preceded by anything else. Yet motion as such is preceded by something else, because it is change and transition, and therefore requires something preceding it. Motion would thus be both preceded by something else and not preceded by anything else.’

We reply:

‘If you make this claim, we say: We do not concede that, if the body were eternal, motion as such would be eternal.

Why could the body not be eternal and rightly described as perpetually moving, with particular motions occurring in succession within it, while none of the motions actually existing could rightly be described as eternal, since each is necessarily preceded by something else?’”

I say:

The substance of this is what he has pointed out elsewhere: the coming into existence of each individual instance does not entail the coming into existence of the kind, which has always existed and will always exist.

“As for his statement, ‘If bodies were moving, they would never be without temporal events,’ we reply:

‘Yes, but why do you assert that whatever is never without temporal events must itself have come into existence?’

He says:

‘If that were not so, an originated event would be eternal.’

We reply:

‘We do not concede this. That would follow only if some particular motion were inseparable from the body. This is not the case. Rather, before every motion there is another motion, with no first motion, extending back without end.’”

I say:

This follows the same line as the preceding argument: what is eternal is the kind of originated event, not any particular event.