Thus, at most, one may suppose that the first intellect was a cause of the second. If He has complete knowledge of the first, He must know its necessary consequences, including its production of the second, as explained earlier.

On any assumption, then, the position of those who deny Him knowledge is no better than that of those who affirm it.

This was Ibn Rushd’s answer to him. He said:

“The answer is that an agent whose knowledge is perfect knows what proceeds from that which proceeds from him, and what proceeds in turn from that, down to the last effect. If, then, the First possesses perfect knowledge, He must know everything that proceeds from Him, whether through an intermediary or without one. This does not entail that His knowledge is of the same kind as ours, for our knowledge is imperfect and comes after its objects. Anyone who seeks to avoid the repugnant assertion that He knows only Himself is excused for doing so.”

As for his statement: “This repugnant consequence necessarily follows from the philosophers’ position in denying will and denying that the world came into existence, so both must be accepted, as they were by the rest of