by will, it is subsequently known that He possesses knowledge. Someone may know that He possesses will without it occurring to him that He possesses knowledge. Not every human being who knows something knows its necessary implications, because human knowledge is limited. By contrast, the Creator’s knowledge is complete: He never knows that which entails something without also knowing its necessary consequence, as explained above.

Accordingly, the correct approach here is to establish the argument Ibn Sīnā presented to demonstrate that He knows created things, for it is a sound argument that does not depend on what they mentioned. However, he should be told: “This argument necessarily entails that He possesses will. Thus, your affirmation of an agent who knows what He produces but possesses no will is contradictory.”

What a proof entails is one thing; the invalidity of that proof is another. The correct course is to hold him to the implications of his sound proof, rather than to challenge the sound proof itself.

As for what he related from his brethren who disputed with him concerning knowledge, they said:

“His essence is such that the existence of all things follows from it by nature and necessity, not by virtue of His knowing them.”

And he said:

“What rules out this doctrine, so long as he agrees with them in denying will?”

He should be told: what rules out this doctrine is the point already established—that His knowledge of Himself necessarily entails His knowledge of His creatures. The discussion here proceeds after establishing that He knows Himself. Thus, whoever says that He knows Himself but not His creatures holds a false position. As for establishing that He knows Himself, this is discussed in its proper place.