the actions proceeding from Him proceed with knowledge. Whatever proceeds with knowledge and wisdom proceeds by the agent’s will, not by natural necessity. For it is not in the nature of knowledge that action should proceed from it, as he reports the philosophers as saying. If we say that He knows two opposites, it would follow that both opposites proceed from Him together, which is impossible. Thus, the fact that one of the two opposites proceeds from Him indicates an attribute additional to knowledge, namely will. This is how the philosophers’ affirmation of will in the First should be understood: in their view, He knows and necessarily wills by virtue of His knowledge.”

Ibn Rushd also said:

“As for Abū Hāmid’s statement that action is of two kinds—either natural or voluntary—it is false. Rather, according to the philosophers, His action is neither natural in any respect nor voluntary without qualification. It is voluntary, but free of the deficiency found in human will. Likewise, the term ‘will’ is applied to both in different senses, just as the term ‘knowledge’ is applied to the two kinds of knowledge: eternal and temporally originated. For in animals and human beings, will is a state of being affected that arises from the object of their will, and is therefore caused by it.