He said:

“If it is objected: ‘Were we to judge that He knows only Himself, this would be utterly appalling. Another being knows itself, knows Him, and knows other things. How, then, can He surpass that being in nobility? How can the effect be nobler than the cause?’

We reply: ‘This appalling consequence follows necessarily from the philosophers’ denial of will and of the world’s coming into existence. It must therefore be accepted, just as the other philosophers have accepted it. There is no alternative but to abandon philosophy and acknowledge that the world came into existence through will.’

Then it may be said: ‘On what grounds do you deny …’”

And so on.

I say: What Abū Hāmid mentioned in disputing his fellow philosophers over whether His knowledge of Himself entails knowledge of His effects has already been explained.

Ibn Sīnā’s disagreement with them on this point is among his merits and virtues: here he grasped some of the truth, and the proof is on his side against them. Abū al-Barakāt, however, did even better than he did in this matter.

Whoever gives the evidence its due and recognizes truths that others have not recognized deserves distinction and praise for doing so.

He did not say, “His understanding of Himself entails something other than Himself.” Rather, he said, “It entails His understanding of His effects,” as explained earlier.