of them. What, then, makes this view impossible, so long as you agree with them in denying will?

Just as the sun’s knowledge of its light is not a condition for the light necessarily proceeding from it—rather, light follows from it by necessity—let the same be supposed of the First. Nothing precludes this.’

The second argument:

Even if it is conceded that something proceeding from an agent also entails the agent’s knowledge of what proceeds, according to them Allah produces only one thing: the first effect, which is a simple intellect. He should therefore know only that effect. The first effect, likewise, would know only what proceeds from it, since all things did not come into existence from Allah at once.

Rather, they came into existence through mediation, generation, and necessary consequence. Thus, what proceeds from that which proceeds from Him need not be known to Him, since only one thing proceeds from Him. Indeed, such knowledge is not necessarily entailed even by voluntary action, so how could it be entailed by natural action? A stone’s movement from a mountaintop may result from its being deliberately set in motion. This entails knowledge of the initial movement, but not knowledge of what subsequently results through it, such as its striking and breaking other things. This, too, is an objection to which he has no answer.”