your fellow philosophers will concede this to you, but it ultimately amounts to saying that whatever apprehends itself apprehends other things.

The reply is: ‘Why do you claim this? It is not self-evident, and Ibn Sīnā alone among the philosophers held this view. How, then, can you claim that it is self-evident? If it requires inference, what is the proof for it?’”

He went on to say:

“The second line of argument is his statement: ‘Even though we do not say that the First wills to bring things into existence, or that all things originated in time, we do say that they are His work and have come into existence from Him. However, He has eternally possessed agency and has therefore eternally been an agent. We differ from others only in this respect, not concerning the basic fact that He acts.

Since an agent must—by common agreement—know his own action, all things, in our view, are brought about by His action.’”

Abū Hāmid said:

“The answer has two aspects.

First, action is of two kinds: voluntary, such as the actions of animals and human beings; and natural, such as the sun’s giving light, fire’s heating, and water’s cooling.

Knowledge of the action is necessary only in voluntary action, as in the crafts