His knowledge of everything besides Himself, even before considering that He is living and that any living being who knows others must all the more know himself.

Indeed, if this proposition—that any living being who knows others must all the more know himself—is self-evident, it remains evident even without mentioning his being alive. Our recognition of this priority does not depend on that consideration, even though life is a condition of all knowledge.

Likewise, when we know that He possesses will, we know that He knows what He wills, even if it does not occur to us that He is living, although life is a condition of both knowledge and will. Thus, knowing that His knowledge of others entails His knowledge of Himself does not depend on knowing this premise, even though this premise also serves to establish the desired conclusion.

Furthermore, Muslims have ways of knowing that Allah knows all things other than inferring this from His will, as explained elsewhere.

The point here is his discussion of what Ibn Sīnā said.

He said:

“The substance of what he said comes down to two lines of argument. The first is that He is pure intellect, and everything that is pure intellect has all intelligibles disclosed to it.”

He went on to say:

“If by His being intellect you mean that He apprehends Himself, then perhaps