Such is the case with Ibn Sīnā and others like him in their exposition of Allah’s knowledge, exalted is He. His discussion of knowledge is seriously deficient in two respects: his inadequate exposition of the truth he mentions, and the falsehood he presents. He states something true and offers evidence for it, but does not do justice to its exposition: he fails to accept all the necessary implications of his proof, and may also fall short in explaining some of its premises. Otherwise, the underlying substance of his argument is sound and well founded. When given its due, it demonstrates that Allah knows all things, both particulars and universals.

Thus, those who criticized Ibn Sīnā’s argument, such as al-Ghazālī, al-Shahrastānī, and al-Rāzī, did so because he had not established his premises, or because he did not accept what they entailed and commit himself to their necessary implications, but instead contradicted himself. They therefore raise objections challenging his proof and advancing counterarguments: they challenge it because he has not established it, and counter it because he contradicts what his premises entail.

Even when these two objections are valid, they demonstrate only Ibn Sīnā’s shortcomings, not any deficiency in the underlying substance of the proof he employed. Rather, it is among the best foundations for an argument, and provides a means of knowing that Allah knows all things, both universals and particulars.

We shall quote from their discussions what makes our point clear.

[Al-Ghazālī’s Discussion in Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), with Ibn Taymiyya’s Commentary]

Al-Ghazālī said:

“An inquiry exposing the inadequacy of those among them who hold that the First knows things other than Himself and knows genera and species in a universal manner.