Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (10/131)

the two instances of knowledge is a condition for the other—that is, necessarily entails it. Nor does it deny that each is a condition for the other and inseparable from it, just as knowledge and power—or knowledge and will—cannot exist one without the other. Each is inseparable from the other, so its existence is, in this respect, a condition for the other’s existence, although neither is the cause of the other’s existence.

Likewise, His knowledge of His holy Essence necessarily entails His knowledge of His creatures and is a condition for His knowledge of them. He cannot know His creatures without knowing Himself, although His knowledge of Himself is not the cause of His knowledge of His creatures. Nor does He need to infer His knowledge of His creatures from His knowledge of Himself. Rather, His holy Essence itself entails knowledge of both.

Even if one of these two is a condition for the other, being a condition for it is different from being its cause. A condition need not precede what is conditional upon it, whereas a cause must precede its effect. A condition does not necessitate what is conditional upon it, whereas a cause necessitates its effect.

Whatever He knows of His creatures, His knowledge of it is conditional upon His knowledge of Himself. His knowledge of Himself necessarily entails His knowledge of it, and His knowledge of it necessarily entails His knowledge of Himself. Yet neither instance of knowledge need precede the other, nor is either the cause of the other’s existence, and He has no need to infer either of the two things known from the other.

Thus, His knowledge that He is the Creator necessarily entails knowledge of His creatures in two respects:

العلمين شرطاً في الآخر، أي ملزوماً له، بل ولا نفي كون كل منهما شرطاً في الآخر وملازماً له، كما أن العلم والقدرة أو الإرادة، كل منهما لا يوجد إلا مع الآخر، وهو ملازم له، فوجوده شرط في وجوده بهذا الاعتبار، وإن لم يكن أحدهما علة لوجود الآخر. وكذلك علمه بنفسه المقدسة، هو مستلزم لعلمه بمخلوقاته، وشرط في علمه بها، فلا يكون عالماً بمخلوقاته، إلا وهو عالم بنفسه، وإن لم يكن علمه بنفسه هو العلة لعلمه بمخلوقاته، ولم يكن هو محتاجاً أن يستدل بعلمه بنفسه على علمه بمخلوقاته، بل نفس ذاته المقدسة اقتضت العلم بهذا وبهذا. وإن كان أحد الأمرين شرطاً في الآخر، فكونه شرطاً في الآخر، غير كونه علة، فإن الشرط لا يجب أن يتقدم على المشروط، والعلة يجب تقدمها على المعلول. والشرط لا يوجب المشروط، والعلة توجب المعلول. فما علمه من مخلوقاته، فعلمه به مشروط بعلمه بنفسه، ويلزم من علمه بنفسه علمه به، ويلزم من علمه به علمه لنفسه، وإن لم يكن أحد العلمين يجب أن يقدم على الآخر، ولا يكون هو العلة في وجود الآخر، ولا يحتاج أن يستدل بأحد المعلومين على الآخر. فلهذا كان علمه بأنه خالق يستلزم العلم بالمخلوقات من وجهين: