even though what any one of these thinkers says may contain falsehood, or he may fall short in explaining the truth, or both.

Thus, from His knowledge of Himself we infer that He must know His creatures, because the two are inseparably connected: the existence of either necessarily entails the existence of the other. We need not make His knowledge of the one the cause of His knowledge of the other.

If it is objected:
“On the assumption that it is not a cause, you have no evidence that His knowledge of Himself necessarily entails His knowledge of His creatures. Likewise, if we suppose that our knowledge of something does not cause us to know what it necessarily entails, we have no evidence that we know the latter.”

The reply is:
“Rather, it is established that one of these two instances of knowledge necessarily entails the other, even if neither causes the other. For something may necessarily entail another whether or not it is its cause. Supposing that it is not a cause does not preclude its necessarily entailing the other.

“Even if, in some people, one instance of knowledge both necessarily entails and causes the other, it need not do both in every knower—unless that knower has no way of knowing what is entailed except through knowing its cause.

“This is false with regard to Allah and cannot be maintained. No one can claim that Allah cannot know any existing thing except through knowing its cause, for there is no evidence for this denial.

“If it is supposed that His essence, in itself, necessarily entails that He knows all things, with nothing hidden from Him, then it necessarily follows that He knows all things.”