As for al-Rāzī’s statement concerning the second supposition:
“If you say that His knowledge of His essence, insofar as it is the cause of that effect, entails His knowledge of that effect, then, since His knowledge that His essence is the cause of a particular thing is knowledge of a specific relation between His essence and that thing, and knowledge of a relation is preceded by knowledge of its two terms, deriving knowledge of the effect from knowledge of that relation would entail circularity.”
The response is:
Knowledge of a relation requires knowledge of its two terms. Knowledge of those terms need not, however, precede it in time. Rather, one knows the relation only while conceiving both terms.
Furthermore, when one term is the cause of the other, knowledge of it as the cause of that effect can entail knowledge of that effect.
Knowledge that it is the cause of the effect includes three things: knowledge of the cause, which is one term of the relation; knowledge of the effect, which is the other term; and knowledge of causality, which is the relation itself.
These three are inseparable; none need precede the others in time. Nor do we say, as he suggested, that knowledge of some of them is derived from knowledge of others.
For the Lord has no need to infer one thing He knows from another. Such inference is needed only by someone who does not know what the evidence indicates until the evidence points him to it. His knowledge, by contrast, is inseparable from His holy Self.