Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (10/125)

Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

any knower’s knowledge of any cause entails knowledge of its effect. For whatever cause may be posited for an effect, or whatever necessitating agent may be supposed for a necessitated result, He, glorified be He, is more perfect in His action and necessitation than that cause is in its necessitation and entailment.

Whatever knower’s knowledge of a cause may be supposed, the Lord’s knowledge of Himself is more perfect than any knower’s knowledge of that cause. For every living being’s knowledge of itself is more perfect than its knowledge of anything else. How much more so, then, is the Lord of the worlds’ knowledge of Himself!

Thus, knowledge of this evidence entails knowledge of what it indicates more fully than any knowledge of any evidence entails knowledge of what it indicates. His knowledge of Himself as this necessitating agent—or cause, principle, or causal factor—entails knowledge of what He necessitates and produces; it is more perfect than any knower’s knowledge of any necessitating agent or cause.

The more a rational person reflects on these meanings and their implications, the clearer it becomes to him that the fact that His knowledge of Himself entails His knowledge of His creation is, when fully conceived, among the most self-evident truths. When approached through reasoning and inference, it is among the strongest propositions supported by rational proofs.

This is further clarified by the following: given that He knows Himself, if someone were to say, “He produces created things without being aware that He does so,” this would be incompatible with His being aware of Himself. For any being who knows himself and is supposed to perform an act must know that he performs it. Indeed, he must conceive of what he brings about even when heedless of himself—how much more so when he knows himself!

He must therefore know what He brings about both through His knowledge of Himself and through the fact that He brings it about by His will, as previously indicated concerning these two approaches. Indeed, if a state were brought about in a self-knowing being by another, he would know of it; otherwise, he would not know himself. How much more so, then, when he himself is the agent!

علم كل عالم بكل علة لكل معلول، فإنه ما من علة تفرض لمعلول، وموجب مقدر لموجب، إلا وهو سبحانه في فعله وإيجابه، أكمل من ذلك في إيجابه واقتضائه. وما من عالم يفرض علمه بعلة، إلا وعلم الرب بنفسه أكمل من علم كل عالم بتلك العلة، فإن علم كل حي بنفسه، أكمل من علمه بغيره، فكيف بعلم رب العالمين بنفسه؟!. وحينئذ فالعلم بهذا الدليل يستلزم العلم بمدلوله، أعظم من استلزام كل علم بكل دليل لكل مدلول، وعلمه بنفسه بكون هذا الموجب، أو العلة أو المبدأ أو السبب، يوجب العلم بموجبه ومعلوله، أكمل من علم كل عالم بكل موجب وعلة. وكلما تدبر العاقل هذه المعاني ولوازمها، تبين له أن كون علمه بنفسه يستلزم علمه بمخلوقه عند التصور التام هي من أعظم البديهيات، وعند النظر والاستدلال هي من أعظم القضايا التي تقوم عليها الأدلة النظرية. ومما يبين ذلك أنه إذا كان عالماً بنفسه، فإن قيل: هو يفعل المخلوقات ولا يشعر بأنه يفعل، فهذا يمتنع أن يكون شاعراً بنفسه، فإنه ما من عالم بنفسه يقدر أنه يفعل شيئاً، إلا ولا بد أن يعلم أنه يفعله، بل لا بد أن يتصور مفعوله مع غفلته عن نفسه، فكيف مع علمه بنفسه؟. فهو يجب أن يعلم مفعوله من جهة علمه بنفسه، ومن جهة أنه يفعله بإرادته، كما تقدم التنبيه على الطريقين، بل العالم بنفسه لو حصل لنفسه حال من غيره لعلم به، وإلا لم يكن عالماً بها، فكيف إذا كانت فاعلة؟!.