entails knowledge of that effect?

Clearly, this premise is not self-evident; it requires proof, yet you have provided none.

The second alternative is false, because His knowledge that His essence is the cause of a particular thing is knowledge of a specific relation between His essence and that thing. Knowledge of a relation between two things presupposes knowledge of each of them. Thus, if knowledge of that effect were derived from knowledge of that relation, circularity would follow, which is impossible.”

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s commentary]

I say:

The following reply may be given to what al-Rāzī has mentioned. He says:

“If you say that His knowledge of His essence, considered as that particular essence, is the cause of His knowledge of His object of knowledge, this is disputed. This premise is not self-evident and therefore requires proof.”

The reply is:

Once fully conceived, it is self-evident; without a complete conception, it requires explanation.

For knowledge of His particular essence is not truly knowledge of it unless it includes knowledge of the concomitants inseparable from that essence in itself, whose inseparability requires no external cause. Muslim speculative thinkers regard all these concomitants as essential attributes. Among the attributes inseparable from their subject, they make no distinction between the constitutive essential attribute and the extrinsic accidental attribute. Rather, they regard them all as essential, meaning that each is inseparable from the essence of its subject, such that the essence cannot exist without it.