and has not come into being. It is therefore not receptive in this respect, but it corresponds to the object known and agrees with it. His knowledge thus follows His own essence, while His creatures follow His knowledge.

The point here is that if He knows Himself, He must necessarily know His creation. This is a sound proposition and can be established in several ways.

First: He cannot have complete knowledge of Himself unless He knows the necessary concomitants of His essence. Creation necessarily follows from His will, which is inseparable from His essence. Whatever He wills comes to be, and whatever He does not will does not come to be; His will is inseparable from His essence.

The philosophers express their principle by saying that He is a complete cause, and that knowledge of the complete cause entails knowledge of the effect.

If any of them acknowledges that He acts by His own choice, yet still calls Him a cause, the dispute with him is merely terminological, and the meaning is sound. For in that case, given His power over a thing, if He wills it, it must exist. Whatever He wills therefore comes to be: through His will and power, He necessitates the existence of whatever He wills. Knowledge of the complete necessitating cause entails knowledge of what it necessitates.

As for someone who does not acknowledge that He acts by His own choice, his position is false insofar as it denies His choice—not insofar as it holds that His being an agent entails knowledge of His effects. If He is assumed to act in this manner, His knowledge of Himself would entail His knowledge of His effects, because knowledge of the complete necessitating cause entails knowledge of what it necessitates.

In short, He cannot know Himself without knowing the necessary concomitants of His essence. His power and will are inseparable from it, and what He wills necessarily follows from His will.

Thus, His effects necessarily follow