This, however, is a weak argument. Those who maintain that the perceived object is imprinted in the perceiver do not say that what is imprinted is equal in size to what exists externally, nor do they say that its nature is the same as that of the external object.

This is merely akin to al-Rāzī’s objection against them: that anyone who perceives fire would have to grow hot, anyone who perceives snow would have to grow cold, and anyone who perceives a millstone would have to revolve, and other such things that no rational person would assert.

For this reason, they express astonishment at—and even ridicule—those who raise such objections against them. They liken the representation of perceived objects in the perceiver to the representation of visible things in a mirror.

It is well known that what appears in a mirror does not match the external object in either nature or size. As for its nature, it is at most an accident inhering in the mirror, whereas the external object being seen is an existing body, such as the sky, the sun, a human being, or anything else seen in a mirror. Likewise, perception is an accident inhering in the perceiver, whereas the perceived object itself is an independently subsisting entity, whether it is seen or known by the heart.

As for its size, the size of what is seen varies with the mirror; thus, if