He said:

“What is most astonishing about this statement is how readily he treats the matter as simple, saying, ‘The matter is clear and simple.’ Were this statement true as presented, the relations of rational souls to bodies would be invalidated. For souls are described in terms of ‘in,’ ‘with,’ and ‘at,’ and of association, separation, absence, and presence, just as an object of perception is described in relation to its perceiver.

“Furthermore, were this true, our intellects could never apprehend the meaning of anything whatsoever that we perceive through our senses. For his view is that sight conveys the form of the visible object to the imagination, which is corporeal. If the intellect apprehends it in the imagination, then it has apprehended it as corporeal as well. If a corporeal faculty apprehends it in the imagination and transfers it to another faculty, where the intellect apprehends it, the same argument still applies, however many intermediaries there may be. For when the intellect first encounters the form, it must encounter it either in a corporeal faculty, in which case the same applies to that faculty as to the first, or in an immaterial faculty, in which case the same applies to it as to the intellect.

“If it is said, ‘The intellect does not apprehend it in the corporeal faculty, but rather raises it to itself and extracts it from there, or abstracts it,’ then all these expressions