and matter, and providential care concerning the order in which both ought to exist?

How could this be, when they say that He is an existence conditioned by the negation of affirmative predication? He is thus an existence defined by negating all known realities, although those realities are distinct from Him. How, then, can the negation of those realities of Him constitute knowledge of Him and of them, and providential care concerning the order in which those realities ought to exist in relation to Him?

Their position thus amounts to making knowledge of Him, knowledge of each individual created thing, and His providential care for created things—which encompasses His will and wisdom, through which created things are ordered—all something purely negative: immateriality, non-absence, or intellection that is nothing additional to His essence. In their view, He is an existence qualified by the negation of all realities of Him. Sound reason plainly recognizes that this cannot hold in external reality.

For what distinguishes two existing things cannot be sheer nonexistence. Even if such a being were assumed to exist, every existing thing would be superior to Him, since it would be distinguished by a positive attribute.

Those among their later followers who say, “He has a particular existence other than this existence,” have not understood the true nature of their position.

For if that particular existence is distinguished by something positive, this is not their position. If it is distinguished only by negation, then this existent would share with other existents what is denoted by “existence,” differing only through negation. All other existents would therefore be superior to Him, if He had any existence.

Explaining the invalidity of their positions denying the divine attributes would take a lengthy discussion. The purpose here is merely to show how some of them refute others, for this reassures many people who might imagine that matters are otherwise.