external. For these necessary concomitants, knowledge of which requires another mental form, are known to us potentially, not actually.

If they describe His knowledge of His effects in the same way, it follows that He knows them potentially, not actually.

They may illustrate their position by the example of knowing things generally while also knowing them in detail, for detailed knowledge is included in general knowledge, even though general knowledge encompasses those details. They liken this to someone who is asked several questions: he may call to mind detailed knowledge of their answers, or he may find within himself a general knowledge of their answers without calling that knowledge to mind in detail; and he may have within himself a general knowledge of their answers without subsequently recalling its details. He replied that this is potential knowledge, and potentiality has degrees: after being asked, the person has a greater capacity to answer than he had before.

As for knowing the answer to each particular question, this cannot occur unless he possesses a mental form of the answer to each one.

He then asserted the premise he shared with them, saying:

“The Necessary Existent is exalted above this.”

This rests on their view that multiple meanings and attributes do not subsist in Him. This premise is the source of their error.

He said:

“If one thing is distinct from another, how can negating one of them constitute knowledge of both, and providential care concerning the order in which they ought to exist?”

For they say:

“He is existence abstracted from matter.”

Yet immaterial things are distinct from material things. How, then, can the negation of matter constitute knowledge of the immaterial