Another objection is that they have not established that the First, the Necessary Being, has genuine knowledge of the particulars of created things, or even of their universals. How, then, can knowledge of their details be acquired through knowing Him, when, according to them, He does not know their details? If knowledge of their details can be acquired only through knowing Him because He is their source, such acquisition is impossible.

Another objection is this: if possessing all the forms of existing things, both particular and universal, as they really are, is an attribute of perfection, then the Lord is more entitled to it than His creatures. If it is an attribute of deficiency, there is no reason to ascribe it to the intellects.

If you say, “We affirm these forms for the intellects so that they may know all things,” the reply is: if knowledge of all things is possible without their forms being present in the knower, then this is possible for the intellect, just as it is possible for the First. If it is not possible, these forms must be affirmed for the First, who is more entitled to them than that which He has produced.

For if the First’s knowledge of a created thing is identical with that created thing itself, the intellect’s knowledge of Him would impart to it knowledge of the created thing without its form subsisting in the intellect; rather, an imprint of the created thing’s form would suffice.

Another objection is this: if the caused intellect acquires its knowledge of existing things only through knowing the First, while those things have no forms in the First’s essence, how can something take form in the intellect’s essence when it has no form in the essence that the intellect knows? How can the derivative be more perfect than its source?

If it is said, “Its knowledge of the First and His effects necessitates the imprinting of forms; thus it acquires this through knowing His existence, not through knowing His knowledge.”