To say, “The attributes are additional to the essence,” is not the same as saying, “Allah’s attributes are additional to Allah,” because what the name “Allah” denotes includes His attributes. Thus, when someone says “Allah,” His attributes are included. If he then says, “They are other than Him,” this suggests that they are separate from Allah and are not included in His name.

As for the term “essence,” it may refer to the essence conceived as devoid of attributes; the attributes are additional to what the term “essence” denotes.

The expression “two distinct things” may mean two things that can be separated from one another. In this sense, an attribute is not distinct from that which possesses it. It may also mean two things, one of which can be known without the other being known. In this sense, an attribute is distinct from that which possesses it, and knowledge is distinct from the knower. This is how these people use the expression, so we address them in their own terminology.

Thus, if someone says:

“The First apprehends His own essence, without any distinction in existence between His essence and His apprehension of His essence,”

we reply:

“This is not conceded. Rather, His apprehension of His essence is not His essence: it is a concept distinct from the concept of essence, even though the two necessarily entail one another.”

The conceptions people form must correspond to reality; otherwise, they are mistaken.

The fact that one thing cannot be distinguished from another in one respect does not mean that it cannot be distinguished from it in another. Taste cannot be distinguished from colour by touch, but the two can be distinguished by sight and taste. Even if we supposed that the distinguishing faculty were absent, this would not preclude their being distinct in reality.

Likewise, if we posit an attribute inseparable from that which possesses it, and do not perceive either of them