are his pupils—I have seen him refute these philosophers’ argument for the eternity of the world in a way that substantiates the refutation I have presented. His response to their argument was more consistent with the religion of the Muslims, as al-Urmawī mentioned, even though he defends the philosophers more than others do.

In a section discussing which doctrines of the philosophers are sound and which are not, he said:

“They then said: ‘What is necessary in itself must be necessary in every respect; that is, all its attributes must necessarily belong to its essence. Either its essence is sufficient to account for its attributes, whether positive or negative, or it is not.

“‘The second alternative is false. Otherwise, one of its attributes would depend on something other than itself, while its essence would depend on the presence or absence of that attribute. Its essence would therefore depend on something other than itself, which is impossible.’”

He said:

“This is weak, for we say: We do not concede that its essence depends on the presence or absence of that attribute. Rather, its essence entails that attribute or its absence. This does not imply that its essence depends on either its presence or its absence.”

He said:

“They then said: ‘The Creator, exalted is He, entails everything upon which the existence of the world depends. His everlasting existence therefore entails the world’s eternity.’ This is impossible, for it is not impossible that He should have newly arising volitions, each depending on another, until, proceeding downward, they culminate in a volition that requires the world to come into being. Thus, its coming into being follows.”