so there are not two mutually distinct instances of knowledge here, unlike His knowledge and the created object He knows, for these are distinct from one another.

Knowledge resides in His holy Self, and the created thing is not distinct from Him; how, then, could the two be identical? Moreover, He—glorified is He—knows a thing before it exists: knowledge of it therefore exists while the known object does not yet exist.

This is unlike His knowledge and His knowledge of His knowledge, for neither can exist without the other. Thus it may be said: His knowledge of Himself includes knowledge of His knowledge and therefore cannot exist without it, whereas His knowledge of created things exists before the created thing exists.

[The Fifth Argument]

His statement:

“Rather, your considerations relating to your essence and to that form alone may multiply through composition.”

The reply is:

This multiplication of considerations is precisely what those who speak of the multiplication of forms mean. Their point is that knowledge of knowing a thing is not identical to knowledge of that thing.

As for whether knowledge is the form of the known object in the knower, apprehension of that form, apprehension of the object without a form, a relation, or something else—this is a dispute about the nature of knowledge.

The point here is that the knower’s knowledge of an object is not identical to that object. He, however, seeks to establish that knowledge of an object is identical to the object itself, just as knowledge of knowing an object is identical to the knowledge that is known.

The response is either to reject the premise or to draw a distinction.