and brought into being is His very knowledge of it. If knowledge is called an intellectual form, the two are still not identical.

If it is said that an intellect’s apprehension of an existing form is possible only through an intellectual form, we do not say that the intellectual form itself has another form.

People disagree here, however, over whether knowledge of knowledge is attained through that knowledge itself or requires a second knowledge. Likewise, does this second knowledge require a third? For those who affirm this, the argument fails.

Those who deny it say:

“Knowledge is that by which other things are known; all the more, then, can it itself be known through itself—like light, by which other things are seen and which is itself seen through itself. Thus, if something other than knowledge requires an intellectual form, it does not follow that knowledge itself requires an intellectual form distinct from itself. Rather, whoever knows something fully knows that he knows it.”

Those who defend the first position say:

“One may know an object yet be oblivious to the fact that one knows it.”

If it is said:

“This is inconceivable with regard to Allah Most High, for He knows created things and knows that He knows them. If His knowledge that He knows is not identical to His knowledge of the object distinct from Him, this entails infinitely many instances of knowledge.”

This is the very argument advanced by al-Tūsī.

The reply is:

His knowledge of Himself necessarily entails that He knows His attributes. Among His attributes is that He knows this and that. Thus, His knowledge of Himself includes knowledge that He knows the objects of knowledge. This knowledge is not identical to His knowledge of created things, but it necessarily entails it. His knowledge of Himself, therefore, necessarily entails knowledge of all His attributes; neither can exist without the other,