is not identical with the knower. Rather, one necessarily grasps the distinction between the knower, the object known, and knowledge, just as one grasps the distinction between the one who wills, the object willed, and the will; between the object seen, the seer, and sight; between the object heard, the hearer, and hearing; and between the beloved, the lover, and love.

But if a single entity is both the knower and the object known, the lover and the beloved, such that it is said to know itself and love itself, then—even though it is both the knower and the object known, the lover and the beloved—its knowledge and love of itself are not identical with its own essence. It can be conceived as neither knowing nor loving itself, and it can be conceived together with its knowledge and love.

It is known that the supposition of existence involves something existent beyond what is supposed in the case of nonexistence. Moreover, the respect in which it is a knower differs from the respect in which it is an object of knowledge, even though the essence is one. As for knowledge itself, it is neither the essence of the knower nor the essence of the object known.

The statement, “A thing cannot be related to itself,” is ambiguous. If what is meant is that it cannot be related to itself in wording, then this is not a rational inquiry. Moreover, the claim is disputed, for he has said “its self” and “its essence.” But that is not what we are discussing.

If, however, he means what concerns us here—namely, that its essence cannot be the object of affirmative relational attributes, such as knowledge, love, and wrongdoing, so that it cannot know itself, love itself, or wrong itself—then this is an obstinate denial of the evident.

Furthermore, even if it is supposed that its apprehension of its own essence involves no intelligible form other than the form of its essence, by which it is what it is, why do you say that the same must hold for the apprehension of every