knowledge, although the vast majority of rational human beings maintain that the falsity of this is necessarily known. Al-Rāzī even said:

“Know that, were it not for people’s fascination with all manner of impressive discourse whose true meaning they fail to grasp, there would be no need to discuss their assertion that a thing that is one in essence is intellect, intellective subject, and intelligible object, without any multiplicity of attributes.”

As for this second premise, I know of no predecessor who held it.

Regarding the first premise, which some of his predecessors held, we say: Why do you say that when a knower knows himself, his knowledge of himself is nothing but his very self? What is the evidence for this? Is this anything more than a mere assertion?

Moreover, it is an assertion whose falsity is known both necessarily and through evidence. A person’s state before knowing himself differs from his state once he knows himself: he knows that he has acquired knowledge he did not previously possess, although his self existed all along. He also knows that when he says, “I knew myself,” this conveys something beyond saying, “My self existed.” Likewise, when he says, “My knowledge of myself exists,” he knows that this conveys something beyond saying, “My self exists.”

His statement, “I knew myself,” is like his saying, “I loved myself,” “I wronged myself,” and “I saw myself.” Are his love for himself, his wronging himself, and his seeing himself, then, his very self?!

[Second argument]

Among the sayings widely known to people is: “Whoever knows himself knows his Lord.” If a person’s knowledge of himself were his very self, everyone would know himself and his Lord.