He had previously said:

“If corruptible things are intellectually apprehended in terms of their abstract essence and its non-individuated concomitants, they are not apprehended as corruptible. If they are apprehended as conjoined with matter and the accidents of matter, they are not objects of intellection, but of sensation or imagination.”

He thus states that when they are intellectually apprehended in terms of their abstract essence and its concomitants, their determinate individual reality is not apprehended. If they are apprehended as determinate particulars, they are objects of sensation, not intellection. Thus, in his view, determinate particulars can only be objects of sensation, not intellection. Yet, according to him, He cannot be described as possessing sense perception. How, then, can he say that no individual thing escapes Him, while also saying that He knows nothing about changing particulars?

[The Fifteenth Argument]

He said:

“Thus, from His own essence He apprehends that of which He is the principle. He is the principle of perfect existents in their individual reality, and of things subject to generation and corruption primarily in their species, and through these in their individual instances.”

Here he affirms that He knows perfect existents in their individual reality, such as the celestial spheres and stars, together with the intellects and souls whose existence they affirm.

Then he said:

“If corruptible things are intellectually apprehended as conjoined with matter and the accidents of matter, they are not objects of intellection, but of sensation or imagination.”