that knows them. For everyone who apprehends a well-ordered act knows it, but not everyone who knows it performs it.

Although these thinkers have made false statements about His action, supposing that only one thing proceeds from Him in the first instance, subject to a condition, they are nevertheless bound to regard everything as His work, whether through an intermediary or without one. They should therefore have said that He knows everything that occurs, just as He brings about everything that occurs, since universals exist in concrete reality only as determinate particulars.

[The Fourteenth Argument]

His statement:

“Rather, the Necessary Existent apprehends everything only in a universal manner. Nevertheless, no individual thing escapes Him; not even an atom’s weight in the heavens or the earth escapes Him. This is among the marvels.”

The reply is:

If you mean that nothing escapes Him insofar as it is universal, does this imply that He knows any particulars? Knowledge of a universal as such does not entail knowledge of any determinate existing thing. Knowing that every human being is an animal does not entail knowing any particular human being, any of his individuating characteristics, or the number of human beings—or even knowing any particular animal.

But if you mean that no determinate thing escapes Him, this is incompatible with your assertion that He apprehends such things only in a universal manner.