knowing it. For knowledge encompasses what is necessary, possible, and impossible, as well as what exists and what does not exist. Action, however, pertains only to what is willed, and, according to those who hold this view, only what is possible in itself and wise to will is willed.

It is well known that a person is praised for not doing what is vile, not for not knowing it. He knows both the goodness and the badness of his actions. No one has ever said that our knowledge of the accounts of those who rejected the messengers, and of the evil deeds they committed, is an imperfection just as those deeds are imperfections. Rather, knowledge of good and evil is an attribute of perfection.

If it is said:

“What he means is that knowledge entails change or multiplicity,”

the reply is:

It is well known that this consequence follows even more necessarily from His bringing about multiple and changing things. For His bringing about multiple and changing things entails qualities subsisting in His essence. Yet this is not an imperfection, nor does His knowledge of them, with these necessary consequences, constitute an imperfection.

If it is said:

“Rather, His bringing about changing and multiple things does not entail multiple, changing qualities subsisting in His essence,”

the reply is:

If this is true, then His knowledge of them is even less likely to entail multiple, changing qualities subsisting in Him. For sound reason plainly recognizes that multiple and changing actions are more apt to entail multiplicity and successive occurrences in the acting essence than multiple and changing objects of knowledge are to entail multiplicity and successive occurrences in the essence