what he knows is base. What, then, of His knowledge of what He Himself has done? If these things exist only as distinct, specific particulars, He must know them as such; otherwise, He would not know them as they really are.

If, by his statement that “many actions on the part of the Necessary Existent constitute an imperfection,” he means actions that He has not done, the corresponding claim would be that His knowledge of what He has not done constitutes an imperfection. But that is not the matter under discussion.

[The Thirteenth Argument]

It may be said:

The people of the earth, Muslims and others, hold two well-known views concerning declaring the Lord above certain actions.

One group says:

There is no imperfection in His doing anything that is possible, and injustice amounts only to something impossible. Rather, He may do anything that is possible. If He does not do it, that is because He does not will it, not because it constitutes an imperfection.

This is the view of the Jahmiyyah and the Ashʿariyyah, as well as groups of jurists belonging to the four schools, scholars of hadith, Sufis, and others.

On this basis, they do not concede that attributing any action to the Necessary Existent constitutes an imperfection. If they reject this concerning action, then they have all the more reason to reject it concerning knowledge.

The second view is that of those who say: Rather, He is above certain actions that are within His power.

This is the view of most people among those who affirm divine decree, such as the Karrāmiyyah, as well as others among the Muʿtazilah and other deniers of divine decree.

It is also the view of many adherents of the four schools, scholars of hadith, Sufis, ordinary people, and others.

On this view, we do not concede that His being above doing something necessarily means that He must be above