On the other view, it may be said:

Rather, knowledge itself is eternal, but its relations arise anew, as Ibn Kullāb maintains.

These thinkers affirm knowledge in pre-eternity, but not bringing into being. If, then, it is established that His being an agent does not entail an act of bringing into being that inheres in His essence, even though relational acts of bringing into being arise anew, then their affirmation of eternal knowledge whose relations arise anew is even further removed from impossibility.

As for those who regard agency as something inhering in the agent and say that it arises anew as the things brought into being arise anew, if they affirm a new state of knowing after the object known comes into existence—while also affirming that He knew what would come to be before it came to be—then His essence entails this state of knowing just as it entails that agency. If that agency is compatible with His necessary existence, so too is this state of knowing.

[The Ninth Argument]

If one supposes a Necessary Existent capable of performing successive originated acts, and another who cannot bring anything into being, sound reason plainly judges that the one who can bring things into being successively is more perfect than the one who cannot bring anything into being.

If someone says, “The former has something potential that becomes actual only gradually, whereas the latter is wholly actual, with nothing potential,” he may be answered:

Everything the latter has in actuality, the former also has, for his essence and those of his attributes that can be eternal are inseparable from him.

As for originated things that can exist only successively, it is impossible for them to be actual and eternally existent without beginning. Thus, they cannot be actual