respect. For the objection would arise only if His knowledge were not inseparable from His essence, but came about through something other than Him; the existence of the attribute would then depend on that other.

If, however, His knowledge is inseparable from His essence, its existence is necessary by virtue of the existence of His essence.

They say that He is necessary in Himself, even though He necessarily entails effects separate from Him. If these effects being inseparable from Him does not compromise the necessary existence of His essence, then His knowledge being inseparable from Him is all the more clearly no objection to it.

[The Sixth Argument]

It may be said: Muslim speculative thinkers hold two views concerning the Lord’s knowledge. The first is that His knowledge is numerically one: through it He knows all objects of knowledge from eternity and forever.

On this view, His existence, together with His attributes, is necessary from eternity and forever. His knowledge therefore does not depend on the existence of any object of knowledge. Rather, when the objects of knowledge come into existence, they become related to it.

Most rational thinkers, including philosophers and others, may, however, say that this is impossible: His knowledge of one thing is distinct from His knowledge of another.

The response is: The second view is that His knowledge is one in kind, but multiple in accordance with the multiplicity of its objects. On this view, is His knowledge that a thing has come to be identical to His knowledge that it will come to be? There are two positions on this.

Some speculative thinkers have maintained that knowledge is a pure relation, and that the Lord’s essence entails this relation provided that the related entity exists.

We shall explain, Allah willing, the correct position on this subject.