If he means by this that He knows things after they come into existence, then there is no doubt that He knows what will be before it comes to be. Once it exists, however, does He then have a new knowledge of it, or is His knowledge of it while nonexistent the same as His knowledge of it when existent? This is disputed among speculative thinkers. Whichever position is correct provides an answer.

If someone says: “The first position is what clear reason indicates, while the second is false; yet the difficulty follows from the first,” he may be answered:

“If that is what clear reason indicates, it is also what sound transmitted evidence indicates. The Quran indicates it in more than ten places, and it is what the reports from the early generations convey. The difficulty raised against it is invalid, as has been explained in its proper place.”

[The Fourth Argument]

Concerning his statement, “It is either constituted by what He apprehends, or His apprehension is accidental to it,” he may be answered:

“We have already explained that this division is invalid—that is, classifying an inseparable attribute as either constitutive or accidental is invalid—and that His knowledge is inseparable from His essence. But suppose the matter were as you say: why do you maintain that knowledge cannot be essential according to your terminology?”

If he says: “This would entail that He is composed of essential attributes, and whatever is composite depends on its constituent part.”