What we have already explained concerning a thing not being constituted by its attribute.

[The second ground]

It may be said:

If we suppose that a subject is constituted by its attribute, is it constituted by its very knowledge of things, or by the known things themselves?

The second is false, yet it is precisely the second that he mentioned when he said:

“Its essence would thus be constituted by what it apprehends.”

This is false. If we suppose that a knower is constituted by his knowledge, what constitutes him is not the object known, but his knowledge of that object. The object known may be separate from him and thus not subsist in him, let alone be inseparable from him, whether essentially or accidentally. How, then, could it constitute him?

If someone says, “By constitution, he means that without the object known, there would be no knowledge,” the reply is:

This is not what he means. Even if it were, it would be false, because on this supposition knowledge could only be constitutive. One could not then say, “It is either constitutive or accidental,” yet he has made this one of the two alternatives.

Furthermore, on this supposition, this would be the objection concerning attaining perfection through the object known that Aristotle raised. The answer to it is already known from several perspectives.

First: that other thing is something He Himself has brought into being, so He has no need of anything other than Himself in any respect.

Second: if we were to suppose the existence of a being independent of Him, knowing it would be more perfect than not knowing it. For knowledge is an attribute of perfection, and when angels and human beings know something independent of them, this is more perfect for them than not knowing it.