the subject is assumed to be eternal and beginningless, necessarily existent in itself, with its attribute inseparable from it, or is assumed to be originated and created, with its attribute inseparable from it.

We discussed this when examining the distinction they draw in logic between an essential, constitutive attribute included within the quiddity, an attribute inseparable from the quiddity, and an attribute which they claim is inseparable from its existence—the latter two being external to the quiddity.

We set out their proposed distinction between an internal necessary concomitant and an external one, their admission that the distinction they proposed does not hold, and their objections to one another on this point. We also showed that their proposed distinction corresponds to no real distinction existing externally or intelligible in the mind, unless “essential” is taken to mean whatever necessarily accompanies the essence posited in the mind.

When, however, we conceive of something and express it in words, some attributes are included intrinsically in what we know and state, while others are included incidentally—the latter being the external necessary concomitants.

This is like what they say regarding signification by correspondence, inclusion, and implication. Signification by correspondence is a term’s signification of the whole meaning intended by the speaker.

Signification by inclusion is a term’s signification of something contained within that meaning. Signification by implication is a term’s signification of something necessarily entailed by that meaning but lying outside the term’s conceptual content.

Signification by correspondence is thus a term’s signification of the entirety of the quiddity intended by the speaker through that term: it signifies the complete quiddity.

And that signified meaning