Abū al-Barakāt said:

“Thus, either He is not a first principle, or He is not necessarily existent in every respect—that is, with respect to His relations to things whose existence is posterior to His in the order of essence.

As for his statement, ‘Were it not for external things, He would not be in such-and-such a state,’ likewise, were it not for created beings, He would not be a first principle. But that is not impossible. The argument has already been refuted both by conceding the premise and by contesting it.

As for his statement, ‘He would have a state that follows not from His essence but from something other than Him,’ this is false. Knowledge is a relation that follows necessarily from His essence with respect to His creatures. His creatures follow necessarily from His essence, and a necessary consequence of a necessary consequence of the essence is itself a necessary consequence of the essence. Thus, it does not follow from something other than Him, as was claimed.

Even if it did, no impossibility would follow. Otherwise, what argument establishes that an impossibility would follow?

They have offered no argument for this, but have presented it as self-evident. Yet it is not self-evident; rather, it is refuted and false, as explained.

As for his statement, ‘Something other than Him would therefore have an effect upon Him’: not with respect to His existence or the necessity of His existence. But with respect to His relations and connections, what principles have disproved this? It has not been disproved, nor can it be. The fallacy succeeds only through the word ‘effect,’ which leads the listener to imagine Him as being acted upon and undergoing change. Knowledge, however, is not a change, as you have learned.