on their false principle in logic: that the attributes inseparable from a subject fall into two categories. Some constitute the essence and are internal to it; they say these are parts of the essence, logically prior to it. Others are external to the essence and accidental to it after its realization, even though they are inseparable from it, with or without mediation.

The invalidity of this division has been demonstrated elsewhere. It has also been shown that attributes inseparable from a subject cannot legitimately be divided into these two categories, nor can the essence be regarded as composed of one category rather than the other. Indeed, the essence cannot be regarded as composed of these attributes at all, unless “composition” means that the essence possesses these attributes and that they subsist in it, or that the essence is inseparable from them, or something similar that all attributes inseparable from a subject have in common.

As for regarding some attributes as internal to the subject’s reality existing outside the mind, and others as external to that reality, this is an utterly unsound claim. The most they can do is to regard it as a composition of whatever attributes of the subject a conceiver conceives. This composition increases and decreases, and what is included in or excluded from the conception depends on the conceiver’s conception, not on the reality existing outside the mind. And if they claim that the reality as such is composed of these attributes, and that this reality exists only in minds, not in