the two states there is a distinct intelligible form, neither of which remains alongside the other. The Necessary Existent would thus be subject to change in its essence.

He said:

Furthermore, if corruptible things are apprehended through their abstract quiddity and its non-individuated concomitants, they are not apprehended as corruptible. If, however, they are perceived as conjoined with matter and its accidents, they are not objects of intellectual apprehension, but of sense or imagination.

He said:

We have explained in other books that every sensory form and every imaginative form is apprehended by us only through a divisible organ. Just as attributing many actions to the Necessary Existent constitutes an imperfection in it, so too does attributing many relations to it. Rather, the Necessary Existent apprehends everything only in a universal manner. Nevertheless, no particular thing escapes its knowledge: not even an atom’s weight in the heavens and the earth escapes it. This is one of the marvels.

I say:

Ibn Sīnā’s division of its attributes into those constitutive of the essence and those that are accidental is based