he intends: that its perfection lies in its activity, which consists in apprehending its own essence. For he has already conceded that its essence possesses the utmost perfection, nobility, and majesty. Its perfection therefore does not derive from any activity, whether apprehending its own essence or apprehending something else. Rather, its apprehension of itself is a noble and perfect act proceeding from the nobility and perfection of its essence. Thus, the perfection of the act derives from the perfection of the essence, not the perfection of the essence from the perfection of the act. This has already been discussed.

He said:

As for his statement, “This is always so, without acquiring knowledge, sensation, opinion, or reflection”—this is perfectly clear. For a perfect, eternal, enduring intellect necessarily perceives and apprehends an eternal, enduring object in a perfect, eternal, enduring manner.

As for his statement, “If the object apprehended by this intellect is something other than itself, then either it is always one and the same thing, or its knowledge concerns one thing after another”—the answer is that He apprehends His own essence and also apprehends other things. He apprehends enduring things perpetually, and apprehends newly occurring things with an eternal and enduring apprehension, with respect to their eternity in kind and in matter, and their eternity deriving from efficient and final causes. Thus, His apprehension of them as they change accords with their change.

That change is not in Him, but in them. He apprehends them all as they are, just as we apprehend some of them: we know their individual identities and that they will exist, their concomitance and that they