color, taste, or smell. How could this be, when nothing exists except what proceeds from Him Most High, or from what proceeds from Him, and is truly from Him? What He does not disdain to create and bring into existence, He does not disdain to perceive. What brings Him no disgrace in doing brings Him no disgrace in knowing. Nor is there any quality—whether color, taste, or smell—that accords with Him so that He prefers it, while another is incompatible with Him so that He dislikes it. Thus we have gained nothing from the objectionable proposition, namely:

“Not seeing certain things is better than seeing them.”

Furthermore, if seeing arises from incapacity and limited ability, it is no better than seeing. If, however, it involves turning away in disgust, then it concerns what is incompatible and harmful, which we have already discussed.

He said:

As for his statement, “The perfection of that intellect, being the highest of perfections, must lie in its own essence, for that essence is the best and most perfect of existing things and the noblest object of thought”—this is a true and sound statement in the sense we have explained, not in the sense