what we have denied—the unity of His objects of apprehension, His relations, and His connections. Rather, it is only the unity of His reality, His essence, and His identity.

Do not suppose that the unity predicated of the Necessary Existent through Himself was asserted merely to declare Him transcendent. Rather, it followed by demonstrative proof from His being the First Principle and His necessary existence through Himself. What followed from this concerned only His reality and essence, not His objects of apprehension and His connections. As for His changing through apprehending changing things, that is a relational matter, not something within the essence itself. This is neither refuted by argument nor ruled out by demonstration. Denying it on grounds of transcendence and exaltation is unwarranted. Rather, declaring Him transcendent above such declarations of transcendence, and exalting Him above such exaltation, would be more fitting.”

I say:

Aristotle’s argument relied solely on ruling out change if He were to know one thing after another. As for a multiplicity of objects of knowledge alongside eternal knowledge, he did not address it, apparently considering it impossible.

Abū al-Barakāt said:

“As for what has been said to rule out change altogether—even changes in cognition and knowledge—it does not necessarily follow for change in general; indeed, it does not necessarily follow at all. Even if it did, it would apply only to certain bodily changes, such as heating and cooling, at certain times—not in every condition and at every time. Nor does anything of the kind necessarily follow in the case of souls, to which cognition and knowledge belong, rather than bodies. For he says that