His being necessarily accompanied by what is other than Him did not constitute a deficiency. How, then, could His knowledge’s necessarily entailing an object of knowledge constitute a deficiency, when He Himself is the Creator of all objects of knowledge?

[Third response]

The reply of those who say that He knows all things through beginningless, eternal knowledge, and that when new objects of knowledge arise, only the relation of His knowledge to them is new. This is the position of many speculative theologians and the jurists who follow them.

They say that knowledge does not depend upon anything whatsoever; rather, it exists eternally, without beginning or end, in one unchanging manner.

[Fourth response]

The reply of those who say that He knows a thing as existent after having known it as nonexistent, and that this second knowledge involves something additional to the first.

They say that both the object of knowledge and the second knowledge come into existence only through His power and will. Thus, He has acquired nothing from another, nor has He been perfected by anything other than Himself.

They also say that whatever comes into existence only through His will and power cannot exist from eternity. Its existence through His power and will is more perfect than its nonexistence. Its existence in this manner is therefore the utmost perfection, while the absence of this perfection is the deficiency from which He must be declared free. For it is a perfection whose existence is possible and which contains no deficiency. Everything of this kind necessarily belongs to Him. Otherwise, it would be either impossible—which contradicts the premise—or possible. In the latter case, that which necessitates it would be His essence together with its necessary concomitants. Since these exist, it must exist; otherwise, it would be impossible, contrary to the premise.

These two responses remove the difficulty posed by Abū al-Barakāt’s statement, in which he held that actual intellection is not a perfection, but that perfection lies only in the capacity for it. He also restricted perfection to the intellection of what is superior, rather than what is inferior. This is indeed a disputed point.

It may be said: Whatever constitutes a perfection when potential is more perfect when it becomes actual