Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (9/418)

Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

than itself. This does not apply to the First Principle, since there is nothing nobler than Him among existent things through the intellection of which He might gain nobility and perfection. The absence of this perfection does not entail the absence of the other. The latter is the first, intrinsic kind—I mean His being such that He can engage in intellection, and His capacity to do so. This is His intrinsic perfection, by virtue of which He is noble, majestic, and exalted above that which does not engage in intellection.

The other is the second, accidental kind—I mean perfection and nobility through objects of intellection. Our being such that we can apprehend what we apprehend is a source of nobility and perfection for us in comparison with that which lacks this capacity.

Many of the objects of intellection that we apprehend do not confer nobility upon us. The nobility arising from actual activity is not the nobility inherent in the capacity for it. The latter exists before, during, and after the activity, whereas the former arises with the activity and through it, and remains after it, but does not exist before it. Allah did not gain nobility through His creatures; rather, He created them by virtue of His nobility. I mean: He did not create and thereby become noble; rather, He was noble and so created. Likewise, He did not know and thereby become perfect; rather, He was perfect and so knew.

I say:

The gist of this is that perfection is what necessarily belongs to Him eternally, without beginning or end. It is inseparable from Him, and nothing of it newly comes into being. It consists in His being such that He can act and engage in intellection, not in the actual existence of a particular act or a particular instance of knowledge. This is the capacity for action and intellection, which belongs to Him intrinsically and does not depend upon any existent thing.

This is why he said that deficiency is inconceivable in a single essence, since deficiency entails multiplicity, and there is no multiplicity there.

It may, however, be objected that, even if the essence is one, when its attributes are multiple—as with power and knowledge—it is possible to conceive of one without the other. Perfection therefore consists in the presence of them all, while deficiency is conceivable through the absence of some of them.

منه، وذلك ليس للأول، إذ ليس أشرف منه في الموجودات، حتى يشرف ويكمل بعقله له، وليس إذا ارتفع هذا عنها ارتفع ذاك، فإن ذاك هو الأول، والذي بالذات -أعني كونه بحيث يعقل، وقدرته على أن يعقل -فهو كماله الذاتي الذي به شرف وجل وعلا عما لا يعقل. والآخر هو الثاني. والذي بالعرض، أعني كماله بمعقولاته وشرفه بها، فإن كوننا بحيث نعقل ما نعقله، شرف لنا وكمال، بالقياس إلى ما ليس له ذلك. وكثير من المعقولات التي نعقلها لا نشرف بها، وليس الشرف الحاصل من الفعل، هو الشرف الذي بالقدرة، فإن الذي بالقدرة قبل الفعل ومعه وبعده، والذي بالفعل يحصل مع الفعل وبه وبعده، ولا يكون قبله، فما شرف الله بمخلوقاته، بل خلق بشرفه، أعني: ما خلق فشرف، بل شرف فخلق، وكذلك ما علم فكمل، بل كمل فعلم. قلت: ملخص هذا أن الكمال هو الذي يجب له أزلاً وأبداً، وهو لازم لا يتجدد منه شيء، وهو كونه بحيث يفعل ويعقل، لا نفس وجود الفعل المعين والعلم المعين، وهذا هو القدرة على الفعل والعقل، وهذا له بذاته لا يتوقف على شيء من الموجودات. ولهذا قال: إن النقص غير متصور في الذات الواحدة، فإن النقص يستلزم التعدد، ولا تعدد هناك. لكن قد يقال على هذا: إنه، وإن كان الذات واحدة، فإذا كانت الصفات متعددة، كالقدرة والعلم، أمكن تقدير أحدهما دون الآخر، فالكمال هو بوجود الجميع، والنقص معقول بعدم بعض ذلك.