would it be? And how can it be conceived? I do not ask, ‘How can it be stated?’ For a speaker may say what he does not conceive, but a knower cannot know what he does not conceive, whether affirmatively or negatively.

If it is said: ‘The deficiency here can be conceived in relation to His essence: He would not apprehend a given thing were it not for that object of intellection—that is, He would not engage in intellection were it not for an object of intellection.’

We reply: His perfection does not consist in His apprehending every existent thing, but in His being such that He can apprehend every existent thing. If the object of intellection exists, He apprehends it. If it is supposed not to exist, that supposition necessarily entails that He does not apprehend it—not in the sense that He cannot apprehend it, but because the deficiency lies in its supposed nonexistence. His perfection and power belong to Him intrinsically, and what pertains to Him in relation to the beings He brings into existence follows necessarily from them. Thus, He did not become perfect by bringing His creatures into existence; rather, His creatures came into existence through His perfection.

This applies not only to the First Principle, but also to us. We do not become perfect through every object of intellection; rather, our perfection consists in our capacity to apprehend it. We become more perfect through what we actually apprehend only when we actually apprehend objects of intellection nobler than ourselves. That is another kind of perfection. For the intellect possesses perfection intrinsically, namely, its capacity for intellection; it also possesses perfection through intellection. This is something it possesses by virtue of its own essence, whether it actually engages in intellection or not.

It also possesses an accidental, relational, acquired perfection through apprehending objects of intellection that are nobler