Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (9/412)

Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

through knowing its effect, even though it is an intellect? Intellection, which is knowledge, is more fitting for it than action.

They know—as does every rational person—that the human soul does not grow weary from knowledge as it does from action. The same applies to the human body: if we can conceive of an action that involves no transformation or change, then we can all the more readily conceive of knowledge of it that involves no transformation or change. And if we can conceive of an action that entails no spatial motion, then it is all the more fitting and appropriate that knowledge of it should not entail such motion.

In short, whatever someone imagines to be a deficiency in knowledge—such as acquiring perfection through another, undergoing change, or being wearisome—applies all the more to its producing the other thing that is known. If action involves no deficiency but is instead a perfection, the same holds for knowledge. Moreover, the other thing mentioned is its effect and creation, which it itself has originated.

If it is said that its perfection comes through that other thing, then its perfection comes only through itself, since it is that thing’s originator. Its essence has therefore not depended on anything other than itself. We understand that, when something has no need of us, our knowing it is more perfect than our not knowing it, even though it has no need of us. Thus, even if something were supposed to exist that was not its effect, its knowing it would be more perfect than its not knowing it. How much more so, then, when that thing is its own effect?

Can it be said that someone who knows things through newly arising acts of knowledge—indeed, who comes to know them after they exist—is less perfect than someone who does not know them at all? How, then, could one who knows them neither before nor after they exist be more perfect?

Even if someone were to call knowledge of changing things change, motion, or the acquisition of perfection through another—whatever such label he might give it—when one who knows things is compared with one who does not, the former is more perfect in every case.

بعلمه بالمفعول مع كونه عقلاً؟ والعقل الذي هو العلم أولى به من الفعل. وهم يعلمون -وكل عاقل- أن نفس الإنسان لا يتعب بالعلم، كما يتعب بالفعل. وكذلك بدنه إذا قدر فعل لا يكون استحالة وتغيراً، فلأن يقدر علم به لا يكون استحالة وتغيراً بطريق الأولى. وإذا قدر فعل لا يوجب حركة مكانية، فالعلم به أن لا يوجب ذلك أولى وأحرى. ففي الجملة كل ما توهم المتوهم أنه نقص في العلم، مثل كونه استكمالاً بالغير، أو كونه تغيراً، أو كونه متعباً، مثله في فعل ذلك لغير المعلوم بطريق الأولى. وإذا كان الفعل لا نقص فيه بل هو كمال، فكذلك للعلم وللغير المذكور، هو مفعوله ومخلوقه الذي هو أبدعه. فإذا قيل: إن كماله به، فليس كماله إلا بنفسه، إذ هو المبدع له، فلم تفتقر نفسه إلى غير نفسه، ونحن نعقل أن ما هو غني عنا علمنا به أكمل من أن لا نعلمه وإن كان غنياً عنا، فلو قدر أن في الوجود ما ليس مفعولاً له، كان أن يعلمه أكمل من أن لا يعلمه، فكيف إذا كان هو مفعوله؟ وهل يقال: إن من علم الأشياء بعلوم متجددة، بل علمها بعد وجودها، أنقص ممن لا يعلمها بحال، فكيف يكون من لا يعلمها قبل وجودها وبعد وجودها؟ ولو سمى مسم العلم بالمتغيرات تغيراً وحركة واستكمالاً بالغير، ومهما سماه من ذلك، فإذا قيس من يعلم الإشياء إلى من لا يعلمها، كان الأول أكمل بكل حال.