all things. We therefore say concerning its creation what you have said concerning its apprehension.

If you say that creation follows necessarily from its essence, we reply that apprehension likewise follows necessarily from its essence.

If you say that this precludes it from apprehending things, lest any perfection be attributed to it thereby, we reply: Then rule out its creating things as well, lest any perfection be attributed to it thereby. Insofar as it does not create, it is not the creator of created things or their First Principle, just as, insofar as it does not apprehend, it does not apprehend intelligibles—even with respect to a single thing that it does not apprehend, just as with a single thing that it does not create.

Whatever consequence follows from knowing what is known follows likewise from creating created things or originating what is originated. For, in relation to something that does not owe its existence to it, it is neither creator nor originator. If this does not entail a deficiency, neither does that. If that entails a deficiency, then so does this. Declaring it exalted above that is like declaring it exalted above this, and its ability to do this is like its ability to do that. Why, then, have you declared it above that but not above this? Why have you feared that apprehending would weary it, but not that acting would do so?’”